FURTHER ARGUMENTS AFTER TRIAL
In TG Master Pte. Ltd. v Tung Kee Development (Singapore) Pte. Ltd & Anor [2023] SGHC 64 (“TG v TK”), Goh Yihan JC held that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear further arguments after a trial.
Facts. In TG v TK, after Goh JC released the decision in TG Master Pte Ltd v Tung Kee Development (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another [2022] SGHC 316, the plaintiff’s counsel wrote to Court on 30 December 2022 to request for further arguments after the trial ([1] TG v TK).
Goh JC agreed to the request, but also directed the Parties to address the Court on whether Goh JC, sitting as a judge in the General Division of the High Court, has jurisdiction to hear further arguments after a trial due to s. 29B of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (“SCJA”) ([2] TG v TK).
The plaintiff argued that there was such a jurisdiction:
The plaintiff first submitted that the decisions of Thomson Plaza (Pte Ltd) v Liquidators of Yaohan Department Store Singapore Pte Ltd (in liqudation) [2001] 2 SLR(R) 246 (“Thomson Plaza”) and Long Well Group Ltd and others v Commerzbank AG and anothers [2018] SGHC 164 (“Long Well”) support the proposition that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to hear further arguments after a trial ([3] TG v TK).
The plaintiff then submitted that as long as the order of court has not been extracted, the court would have inherent jurisdiction to hear further arguments ([4] TG v TK).
The plaintiff lastly submitted that while s. 29B SCJA provides for the High Court’s ability to hear further arguments after a hearing that is not a trial, it does not otherwise affect the High Court’s ability to hear further arguments after a trial ([5] TG v TK).
Decision. As set out in [2] TG v TK, Goh JC decided that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear further arguments after a trial.
Before we turn why Goh JC disagreed with the plaintiff’s arguments, we note that Goh JC addressed the distinction between the High Court’s jurisdiction and power to make substantive versus non-substantive amendments as set out in [6] – [19] TG v TK as well as what TG v TK is not about at [20] TG v TK.
We now summarise Goh JC’s reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the Court has jurisdiction to hear further arguments.
Goh JC held that Parliament had curtailed the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to hear further arguments after a trial due to s. 29B SCJA at [27] – [34] TG v TK. Goh JC found that the insertion of a new s. 28B in the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 2010 (which is the predecessor provision of s. 29B SCJA) was a marked departure from s. 34(1)(c) of the SCJA 1999, as it “… shows that Parliament had, by the 2010 Amendment, moved from merely recognising to conferring the jurisdiction on the High Court to hear further arguments” ([29] TG v TK).
Further, the report by the Law Reform Committee (Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Rationalisation of Legislation Relating to Leave to Appeal (October 2008) shows that the “key thread” behind the need to retain the right to request for further arguments is the “significant time pressure that can arise in interlocutory applications”, which is unlikely to arise in the context of a civil trial ([33] – [34] TG v TK).
Goh JC also disagreed that s. 29B SCJA is an “enabling provision” at [35] – [36] TG v TK. Among others, Goh JC found that this argument “… implies that Parliament has deemed it unnecessary to provide any deadlines that restrict when further arguments may be heard after a trial. This would go against the stated policy aims of such deadlines.” ([35] TG v TK).
As for Thomson Plaza and Long Well, Goh JC found that the cases can be distinguished at [37] – [40] TG v TK. Among others, Thomson Plaza was decided in June 2001, when the operative statute was the SCJA 1999 which did not contain the equivalent of s. 29B SCJA.
Lastly, Goh JC noted that there would be practical concerns if “further arguments were ordinarily heard and considered as a matter of course” at [48] – [50] TG v TK. In this regard, Goh JC noted that if the plaintiff wishes to introduce new arguments and to admit further evidence, the appellate court can decide on these matters.
Significance. TG v TK is important as it serves as a reminder that once a judgment has been rendered, it is difficult to “re-argue” the merits of the case. This is important as there must be finality in litigation. If litigants can readily “re-argue“ cases, then it may open the proverbial floodgates.
TG v TK is also important when we look at the Rules of Court 2021. This is because, among others, the Ideals as set out in O. 3, r. 1 of the Rules of Court 2021 include achieving “efficient use of court resources” and “fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties”.
Hence, bearing this in mind, even without TG v TK, we would not expect the Court to readily allow a party to raise further arguments after a trial.
Indeed, as alluded to by Goh JC at [48] – [50] TG v TK, we would not expect the Court (under the Rules of Court 2021) to readily allow a party to adduce a new argument / new evidence if a party has the “luxury of time” to raise such new arguments / new evidence but had failed to do so at the appropriate time, especially if such new argument / evidence is sought to be raised after a hearing.
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